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RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
COAL-BASED FUELS
JOEL ZIPP*
AUSON POCCIA**

I.

INTRODUCTION***

Production of significant amounts of synthetic fuel in the 1990's
will require the establishment of a large, new, multi-faceted indus
try over a limited period of time. A synthetic fuel production ca
pacity of 1.5 million barrels per day will require capital
investments in excess of $110 billion (in current dollars), some
portion of which will have to be provided by outright Federal
funding or underwritten by a variety of Federal guarantees. l
On June 30, 1980 President Carter signed into law the United
States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act (SFCA) of 1980,2 a major
commitment of public funds to the development of a commercial
synthetic fuels industry. Government interest in synthetic fuels is
not a new idea. The O'Mahoney-Randolph Synthetic Liquid Fuels
Act of 19443 created a program run by the Office of Synthetic Liquid
• B.S., M.S., University of Wisconsin, 1970, 1972; 1.0., Case Western Reserve
University Law School, 1975; partner in the law firm of Morley, Caskin & Generelly,
Washington, D.C.
.. B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1978; J.D., Western New England
College School of Law, 1981; associate in the law firm of Berkman, Ruslander, Pohl,
Lieber & Engel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
*** For their contributions to the technology and environment sections of this
article, the authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ezekail Clark, an independ
ent consultant on energy matters who served as Acting Assistant Director for Gasifica
tion Development in the Fossil Energy Program of the Department of Energy, and
Thomas Price of Western New England College School of Law.
1. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS & SENATE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REpORT ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION
ACT EXTENSION AMENDMENTS OF 1979, S. REp. No. 96-387, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 131
(1979) [hereinafter cited as EXTENDING THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT].
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8701-8795 (West Supp. 1980). The United States Synthetic Fu
els Corporation Act of 1980 was enacted as Part B of Title I of the Energy Security Act of
1980. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 111-95 (1980).
3. Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944, 30 U.S.C. §§ 321-325 (1976).
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Fuels which sponsored $87.6 million of research and demonstration
projects on liquid fuels derived from coal, oil shale, and agricultural
and forestry products over a twelve-year period. 4 In 1974, the Fed
eral Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development ActS author
ized the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA), predecessor of the Department of Energy (DOE), to under
take a wide range of joint ventures with private industry to foster
development of alternative fuels. 6 The Synthetic Fuels Corporation
(SFC), however, with an initial authorization of $20 billion and an
other $68 billion projected over a twelve-year period,7 represents a
different kind of undertaking. Federal dollars invested in the SFC
are intended to support commercial development, whereas the prior
acts supported technological development. 8
Commercial production of synthetic fuels from coal has proven
successful in other countries. Twenty-five plants produced 5 million
tons of synthetic oil and liquefied gas per year to fuel the German
war effort from 1939 to 1945.9 In the early 1950's, the Republic of
South Africa built a state owned petrochemical and fuel complex,
SASOL I, which produces a full range of petrochemical derivatives,
including synthetic oil and gas. lO A second, larger plant, SASOL II,
produ~es liquid fuels from 40,000 tons of coal per day}l With the
completion of two more plants scheduled by the mid-1980's, South
Africa will become substantially independent of crude oil importS. l2
At a time of unprecedented demand for oil and gas, however, and in
the face of uncertain supplies and sharply escalating prices of im
ported fuel, not a single commercial-sized plant for producing syn
thetic fuels from coal has been built in the United StatesP Why has
4. Olson, Coal Liquefaction: Issues Presented By A Developing Technology, 12
TuLSA L.J. 657, 660 (1977).
5. Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5901-5920 (West Supp. 1981).
6. Id. §§ 5906-5907 (West 1979).
7. Id. § 8751 (West Supp. 1980).
8. See notes 143-45 infra and accompanying text.
9. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SYNTHETIC Fu
ELS FROM COAL: STATUS AND OUTLOOK OF COAL GASIFICATION AND LIQUEFACTION,
SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 48 (Comm. Print 1979) [herein
after as cited SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL].
10. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
OVERSIGHT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 25 (Comm.
Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND
THE MIDDLE EASTj.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The largest coal-based synthetic fuels plants operating in the United States are
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the private sector failed to invest in synthetic fuels? Why has the
government been called upon to subsidize this potentially lucrative
new industry?
This article will examine some of the technological, environ
mental, and market risks involved in launching coal-based, synthetic
fuel projects on a commercial scale. A discussion of the financing
arrangements for a coal gasification projec,t that has been in the
planning stages for many years will illustrate market efforts to mini
mize those risks. Finally, both the policy implications and the prob
able effects of the SFCA will be discussed.
II.

TECHNOLOGY: STATE OF THE ART

Coal, shale oil, tar sands, and biomass l4 are the major sources
for synthetic fuels. Of these, coal and shale oil have the greatest po
tential; the United States has recoverable coal reserves estimated at
more than 250 billion tons and recoverable shale oil reserves of
about 600 billion barrels. IS While tar sands and biomass have
equally impressive capacities, the technologies and environmental
impacts of the conversion processes for these materials presently are
not well defined. 16
The basic technology for producing gaseous and liquid fuels
from coal is known. In the gasification process, lump or pulverized
coal is reacted with air or pure oxygen and steam at extreme temper
atures to produce a combustible gaseous mixture. 17 When air and
steam are used as reactants, a low-Btu l8 gas is produced which, after
Ashland Oil's H-Coal pilot plant in Catlettsburg, Kentucky, and Exxon's Donor Solvent
pilot plant in Baytown, Texas. Each produces about 600 barrels of crude oil equivalent
per day. Both plants were built as joint ventures with the Department of Energy. [1980]
EN. USERS REp. (BNA) No. 371, at 18.
14. Biomass is defined as "the amount of living matter of one or more kinds of
organisms present in a particular habitat usually expressed as weight of organisms per
unit area of habitat or as volume or weight of organisms per unit volume of
habitat. . . ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 218 (1976).
IS. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, Two ENERGY FUTURES: A NATIONAL
CHOICE FOR THE 80's, at 95 (1980).
16. See FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS 477 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY] (suggesting only the lack of technol
ogy in obtaining biomass from the environment limits its use as a source of energy);
[1978] I ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) ~ 3784, at 3805 (suggesting that recovery of oil from tar
sands could be economically attractive if there is a "significant breakthrough in this
area").
17. [1978] I ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) ~ 3746.
18. A Btu, British thermal unit, is the amount of energy required to raise the tem
perature of one pound of water one degree farenheit. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA
TIONAL DICTIONARY 279 (1976). The gradations of synthetic gas are as follows: Low
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purification to remove particulates and sulfur compounds, may be
used as a fuel for process heat or power production. 19 When pure
oxygen and steam are the reactants, a medium-Btu gas is produced,
consisting primarily of a mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide
plus varying amounts of methane and other gases. 20 Medium-Btu
gas has a higher heating value than low-Btu gas and, after purifica
tion, may be used as a gaseous fuel or as a starting point for a variety
of chemicals or liquid fuels. 21 Purified medium-Btu gas may also be
reacted over suitable catalysts to produce high-Btu gas. 22 This prod
uct is a direct substitute for natural gas23 and may be mixed with
natural gas in transmission pipelines. 24
There are several coal liquefaction processes under study today.
In the indirect liquefaction process used at the SASOL plants in
South Africa, gasifiers first produce raw synthetic gas from crushed
coal.2 5 After purification, the carbon monoxide and hydrogen in the
gas are converted to liquid hydrocarbons and oxygenated chemicals
within fluid-bed reactors. 26 Although ethylene, alcohols, ketones,
ammonia, and sulfur are produced, hydrocarbons such as gasoline,
diesel fuel, and heavy oil are the main products. 27
In direct liquefaction processes, a mixture of pulverized coal
and an oil-type solvent is reacted with hydrogen under heat and
pressure to produce a product that is the functional equivalent of
petroleum. 28 Further refining yields fuel for industrial and domestic
heating, generation of electricity, and use in automobiles. 29 No comBtu gas ranges from 150 to 300 Btu/cubic foot; medium-Btu gas ranges from 300 to 650
Btu/cubic foot; and high-Btu gas compares with natural gas at 900 to 1000 Btu/cubic
foot. See, e.g., Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1136 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
19. [1978) I ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) , 3748, at 3774.
20. See FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16, at 308.
21. See, e.g. , OVERSIGHT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE
EAST supra note 10, at 25, 53-55, for brief discussions of petrochemical production at
SASOL I.
22. See generally [1978)1 ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) , 3746, at 3769 (catalytic actions
required to convert the gas to its final methane form).
23. FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16, at 308.
24. [1978) I ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) , 3746, at 3769.
25. S. REp. No. 166, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1980), reprinted in [1980) U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1884. The SASOL plants use the "Fisher-Tropsch" process. Id.

26. Id.
Id.
28. See id. SASOL II is designed to convert coal into gasoline and diesel products,

27.

among other things.
29. S. REP. No. 166, supra note 25, at 138-40, reprinted in [1980) U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 1884-86.
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mercial plants for direct liquefaction of coal, however, currently are
in operation in the United States.
While the SASOL plants leave little doubt that production of
gaseous and liquid fuels from coal is feasible, significant questions
remain as to whether this technology is transferable to the United
States. Scaling up novel processes is a more difficult venture and
greater risks are involved. 30 An additional problem involves the ca
pability of plants to sustain production at design capacity over long
periods of time without substantial downtime for maintenance. Coal
presents special difficulties because various kinds of coaPI require
different handling techniques, respond differently in chemical reac
tions, and produce different concentrations of products and byprod
uctS.32 Techniques successful with one variety of coal may fail with
another.33
The sheer size of a full-scale synthetic fuel plant presents other
problems. Where projects are situated in rural areas, shortages of
particular kinds of equipment and of specialized construction skills
could develop locally and delay construction. Construction crews on
the SASOL II plant peaked at 20,000 workers. 34 A DOE study indi
cates that a 100,000 barrel per day syncrude plant would require a
population increment of 20,500 people at a rural construction site. 35
Significant social dislocations accompanying the influx of workers
into isolated communities could result in excessively high labor turn
over and decreased worker productivity.36
30. See Stobaugh & Yergin, Energy Wars, in ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE
ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, 271, 282 (R. Stobaugh & D.
Yergin 1980) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY FUTURE).
31. The four major varieties of coal are: Bituminous; anthracite; coke; and lignite.
WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 432 (1976).
32. See [1978) I ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) ~ 3746 (different grades of coal may re
quire different gasification processes).
33. See generally SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 9, at 55-64 for a dis
cussion of various liquefaction processes using different kinds of coal.
34. ExTENDING THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT, supra note I, at 138.
35. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS OF SYNTHETIC LIQUID
FUELS 776 (1979).
36. "[I)n the construction of the Jim Bridger Power Generating Facility in Rock
Springs, Wyoming, the company suffered greatly from productivity problems due to so
cial disruption. Some observers have estimated that the impact of this productivity de
cline nearly doubled the originally estimated cost of the plant." EXTENDING THE
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT, supra note 1, at 24 (quoting Richard Lamm, Governor of
Colorado). For a discussion of placing responsibility for social costs oflarge-scale power
plant construction, see Watson, Measuring and Mitigating Socio-Economic Environmental
Impacts of Constructing Energy Projects: An Emerging Regulatory Issue, 10 NAT. RE
SOURCES LAW. 393 (1977).
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REGULATORY RISK

Coal has been characterized as one of the most environmentally
disruptive energy sources. 37 Underground mining may disturb the
natural drainage patterns of subterranean water systems and pollute
them with a variety of substances.38 Strip mining, the most economi
cal mining method for many coal deposits,39 may ruin surface
land. 40 Although adequate reclamation does not necessitate a return
to prior conditions, excessive erosion, especially in arid and hilly re
gions, may make even marginal reclamation impossible.
Conversion to synthetic fuels eliminates most of the pollution
problems associated with the direct combustion of coal. The conver
sion plants themselves, however, create a new set of environmental,
health, and safety concerns. The exact nature and magnitude of
these environmental impacts will be discovered only through the op
eration of demonstration plants or full-scale plants. 41
The solid waste from a gasification reactor is similar in quantity
to that produced in direct coal combustion. There may be differ
ences, however, in leachability, organic content, and chemical states
of the components, depending on the process used. Leachability
tests indicate that higher gasification temperatures produce less
leachable solid residues. 42 Some processes, therefore, will require
careful waste disposal.
Depending on the conversion process used, waste process water
may be contaminated with tars, oils, soluble organic materials, hy
drocarbons, and dissolved inorganic salts. While water purification
and reuse procedures have been developed for gasification processes
in commercial use in other countries,43 much of the plant's cost may
be involved in the control of effiuents.44
37. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY IN TRANSITION, 1985-2010, FINAL
REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SYSTEMS 479
(1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY IN TRANSITION).
38. See FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16, at 296.
39. See id. at 286.
40. Id. at 296.
41. The total environmental and health impact of coal conversion is not estab
lished. While end-use combustion of synthetic fuels is comparable to natural gas com
bustion, SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 9, at 101-07, the sum of waste
products at the conversion site and at the end use may equal or exceed those produced by
direct conventional burning of coal. Id. at 77-101.
42. See FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16, at 315.
43. See OVERSIGHT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE
EAST, supra note to, at 21-28, for a discussion of water purification at SASOL I and
subsequent design changes for SASOL II and III.
44. See generally OVERSIGHT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND THE

19811

RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES

245

The vent gases released from coal conversion plants will be es
sentially free ofpollutants. 45 The size and complexity of these plants
and the ever-present possibility of fugitive emissions, however, will
necessitate constant surveillance and monitoring. 46
Conditions of combustion of any fossil fuel composition pro
duce various amounts of sulfur and nitrogen oxides. 47 The possible
long-range environmental effects of these substances raise serious
questions about the wisdom of developing coal-based synthetic fuels
as an alternative energy source. 48 Sulfur and nitrogen oxides re
leased into the atmosphere combine with water to produce acid
rams.49 Acid precipitation contaminates water supplies, upsets
aquatic ecosystems, and increases the concentrations of dissolved
toxic trace metals in the soil. 50 Because they have been purified in
the conversion process, synthetic fuels release less sulfur than does
coal upon combustion. 51
While coal-based synthetic fuels, as compared with coal itself,
generally will reduce the release of sulfur compounds and nitrogen
oxides, they will not reduce the overall release of carbon dioxide. 52
Carbon dioxide acts as a blanket, trapping heat within the earth's
atmosphere.53 A significant increase in the level of atmospheric car
bon dioxide due to combustion of fossil fuels could seriously disturb
the global climate by raising the mean global temperatures. 54 Ac
cording to the National Research Council, climate changes due to
carbon dioxide emissions would be irreversible by the time they were
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 10, at 21, 23, for a brief discussion of water purification
problems at SASOL I and the cost of design changes for SASOL II.
45. See FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16, at 316. ("Most of the air
pollutants produced during the coal conversion step must be reduced- to low levels for
process reasons or to meet product quality requirements, so the amount finally dis
charged or contained in the product should be small.").
46. The Environmental Protection Agency will determine environmental require
ments for synfuels projects on a case-by-case basis. It plans to issue nonbinding pollu
tion control standards for six major synfuel production technologies during 1981. (19801
EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 385, at 14.
47. FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16, at 336.
48. Id. at 341.
49. Id. at 338-43.
50. Id.
51. ENERGY IN TRANSITION, supra note 37, at 487.
52. See Synthetic Fuels: Hearings on S. 1J77 Before the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1979) (statement of Gordon T. MacDonald) (synthetic
fuels produce two to three times as much carbon dioxide as do natural fuels). 
53. Id.
54. Id. at 52-53.
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detected.55
Another area of concern is the availability of water. In many
western regions currently proposed as sites for conversion facilities,
water is a scarce resource. Although the magnitude of the problem
as a potential source of environmental disruption is a matter of de
bate,56 a Ford Foundation ·study57 concluded that the. water alloca
tion among numerous competing interests is primarily an economic
and political problem. 58 The markets as well as legal and political
institutions will have to evaluate the demand, price, and availability
of water and determine who will pay how much for what quantities
of this resource. 59
.
The costs of solving the environmental problems raised by syn
thetic fuel production, unlike those of solving purely technological
problems, are determined by standards set by the govemment. 60 In
vestors do not ask how much environmental damage a project will
do, but how much the required land reclamation, emission controls,
worker safety precautions, water conservation, and waste disposal
will add to construction and operating costS.61 The risks that the
various agencies involved in environmental regulation will impose
impossible or impractical standards, change their requirements mid
stream, or simply consume precious time in making a decision, are of
primary concern to investors. 62 According to the Chairman of the
new SFC, the cost of a $2 billion plant increases by $30,000 for each
hour that construction is delayed. 63 The Committee for Economic
55. The Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, comprising Title VII of the Energy Secur
ity Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8901-8912 (West Supp. 1980), authorizes expenditure of
$8 million in fiscal year 1981 for studies on the impact of synthetic fuels development on
acid precipitation and atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. Id. §§ 8905, 8912.
56. "Reduced flow and hydrological modifications necessary to assure water sup
plies during periods of low flow will significantly change the basic ecological conditions
in these [western] river basins." Water Available for Energy Development in the West:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Production and Supply ofthe Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 51 (1978) (statement of Alan Mer
son, Reg. Adm'r, Region 8, Environmental Protection Agency).
57. FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16.
58. Id. at 316-23.
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8743 (West Supp. 1980).
61. See generally Synthetic Fuels Legislation: Hearings on S. 932, S. 1308 and S.
1377 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
396 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Synthetic Fuels Legislation] (statement of David Ormes,
Vice Pres., Banker's Trust Co.) ("changes in regulations can easily cause what was a
financially defensible project to become uneconomical").
62. Id. at 395-96.
63. Synthetic Fuels Corporation Nominations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
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Development, an independent research group of business executives
and educators,64 reported to the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources that the difficulties in applying current environ
mental regulations to synthetic fuel production stem partly from the
technical complexity of the processes involved and the physical char
acteristics of the likely locations of the plants. 65 The Committee,
however, concluded: "Most importantly, [the difficulties] stem from
the delays and uncertainties surrounding governmental actions on
environmental matters. These can add enough to the already high
risks in synthetic fuel ventures to effectively discourage private in
vestment in such ventures."66
IV.

MARKETS: THE ULTIMATE QUESTION

Technological, environmental, and regulatory uncertainties
combine to produce a broad range of estimates for the cost of coal
based synthetic fuels. While the prospect of significant cost overruns
during construction kindle fears that debt repayment may be
delayed, investors' long-range concern is with the marketability of
the product, measured by the price of synthetic fuels compared to the
price of available alternative fuels. 67 Such alternatives include for
eign and domestic fuels. The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 and the
Iranian crisis highlighted the unreliability of foreign oil supplies.
The pricing policies of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) appear to be beyond our control or prediction.
The foreign policy of the United States, however, will have some
impact on both the quantity and the price of imports available, and a
viable synthetic fuel industry in the United States may put a ceiling·
on OPEC price increases. 68
Price controls on domestic oil and natural gas have seriously
distorted the energy market in the United States by increasing de
mand and limiting incentive for production. 69 President Reagan
lifted price controls on domestic oil in January 1981,1° and the Natu:"
ral Gas Policy Act of 1978 (Natural Gas Act) provides for decontrol
on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (testimony of John
Sawhill).
64. Synthetic Fuels Legislation, supra note 61, at 141 (statement of the Research
and Policy Comm. of the Comm. for Economic Development).
65. Id. at 185.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 393-97 (statement of David Ormes, Vice Pres., Banker's Trust Co.),
68. EXTENDING THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT, supra note I, at 133.
69. Stobaugh & Yergin, ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 30, at 275-76.
70. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9,909 (1981).
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of most natural gas prices by 1985. 71 The full impact of these ac
tions, however, will not be realized for several years. Electric utili
ties, which consume thirty-one percent of the fuel used in this
country annually,72 remain subject to stringent rate regulation. Gov
ernment manipulation of the market in which synthetic fuels must
compete, directly by price controls and indirectly by tax mecha
nisms, is a major source of speculation and uncertainty for potential
investors. 73
In assessing the prospects of a synthetic fuel plant, investors
must project the costs associated with current government policies
into a politically and economically volatile future. Commercial
sized plants require enormous capital outlays, and lead times are es
timated at five years or more. 74 Unanticipated changes in environ
mental and other government requirements or in the prices of
domestic or imported oil could tum a $1.5 billion project into a
financial disaster. While some within the government still argue that
the private market should determine the optimum timing and level
of commercial synthetic fuels development,75 the pervasive and mul
tifarious effects of government involvement in the energy field can
not be ignored. To a great extent, the risks investors have faced in
the synthetic fuels industry were created and controlled, not by free
market forces, but by government actions. The present administra
tion, however, may change the investment climate in the synthetic
fuel market.
During the 1970's, American industries of all kinds suffered
from tight capital markets. 76 Regulated utility companies had diffi
culties in raising sufficient capital for conventional outlays.77 Special
risks and high stakes are involved in building a commercial-sized
synthetic fuel facility. It is not surprising that the energy industry
7I. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3331 (West Supp. 1980).
72. (1981) EN. USERS REP. REFERENCE FILE (BNA) at 0109.
73. Horwitch, CoaL' Constrained Abundance, in ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 30,
at 93, 123.
74. Stobaugh & Yergin, ENERGY FUTURE supra note 30, at 282-83.
Market forces, as they are perceived by decision-makers in the private
75.
sector, will determine the economically optimal mix of alternative energy tech
nologies to displace the undue reliance on petroleum and natural gas. . . . An
important theme of this rer0rt is that the private sector and market forces are
the most efficient means 0 achieving the Nation's energy goals.
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, A NATIONAL PLAN FOR EN
ERGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION: CREATING ENERGY CHOICES
FOR THE FUTURE 37 (1976).
76. Solomon & Belzer, Looking Ahead' Capital Shortages, Tax Policy, and Eco
nomic Planning, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 251 (1975).
77. Horwitch, supra note 73, at 93, 100.
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has had difficulty attracting sufficient investment to support such a
project. A particularly innovative financing scheme developed by a
consortium of pipeline companies for the construction of a coal gas
ification plant illustrates the crucial role of government actions in
investment planning.
V.

THE GREAT PLAINS COAL GASIFICATION PROJECT: A
PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE

In March 1975, the Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Company
(Michigan-Wisconsin) and its affiliate, ANG Coal Gasification Re
sources Company (ANG), filed an application with the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) seeking a certificate of public convenience
and necessity in order to permit ANG to sell synthetic natural gas
from a proposed coal gasification plant, commingled with natural
gas, to Michigan-Wisconsin. 78 While the FPC had no direct power
to regulate production, transportation, or sale of synthetic gas under
the Natural Gas Act, it may have had the authority to set the rates
that Michigan-Wisconsin, an FPC jurisdiction natural gas pipeline
company, could charge its customers for commingled natural and
synthetic gas. 79 By structuring the project to bring it within the juris
diction of the FPC, the companies hopeq to reduce the risk that the
coal gas produced would be too expensive to be competitive. 80 If the
FPC had jurisdiction, it could authorize the regulated pipeline com
pany to charge a higher rate for all gas to reflect the rolled-in cost of
the synthetic gas. 81 Michigan-Wisconsin also sought permission to
include interest on debt and return on equity investment during con
struction of the gasification plant in its current rates,82 thus assuring
investors of a return on capital even before their investment pro
duced any fuel for sale. Although the FPC usually required that
carrying costs on construction funds be included in the rate base
only after the plant became operative,83 the companies urged that a
surcharge to cover interest on debt and a return on equity during
78. FERC Op. No. 69, [1979] UTiL. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 12,247, at 14,280, 14,283
(Nov. 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as FERC Op. No. 69].
79. Henry v. FPC, 513 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (FPC has discretion to consider all relevant
factors in setting just and reasonable rates.).
80. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
81. Cf Pacific Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 536 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976) (FPC may require a new application to add exploration costs to a
cost-of-service tariff.).
82. FERC Op. No. 69, supra note 78, at 14,282-83.
83. Id. at 14,287.
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construction was necessary to procure financing. 84
Between 1975 and 1978, four hearings were held before the FPC
and its successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC),85 to consider the scope and purpose of the project. 86 The
FERC changed the original plan. The final'plan envisioned a plant
designed to produce during its initial phase an average of 125 mil
lion cubic feet of high-Btu gas per day (half the original amount)
from lignite coal obtained from an adjacent strip mine. 87 The plant
would be built in Mercer County, North Dakota by Great Plains
Gasification Associates, a consortium of five affiliates of natural gas
pipeline companies. 88 While economic conditions made cost projec
tions uncertain, project sponsors estimated that, in 1978 dollars, the
total installed cost of the gasification plant would be approximately
$900 million. 89 The associated coal mine would cost an additional
$85 million. 90 A 7.5%annual rate of inflation was assumed, bringing
the estimate of the capital costs of the plant and mine to approxi
mately $1.2 to 1.5 billion. 91 An analysis considering the impact of
inflation, cost overruns, and change in plant output concluded the
initial cost of gas could range from $5.56 to $8.62 per thousand cubic
feet.92
A major factor underlying the sponsors' choice of financing was
the magnitude of the investment required for the project in relation
to the small quantity of coal gas to be produced. 93 In an effort to
reduce their exposure to risk, particularly with respect to the debt
financing, and at the suggestion of the DOE, the sponsors chose
84. Ia.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (1977) created the FPC. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7151, 7172 (West
Supp. 1980) created the FERC and transferred to it the powers formerly vested in the
FPC.
86. Included in the scope and purpose of the project were its technological feasibil
ity and anticipated environmental impact, the marketability of the synthetic gas, and the
proposed financing plan. See Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
87. Ia. at 1135-36.
88. Ia. at 1135.
89. Ia. at 1135 n.4.
90. Ill,
91.

Ia.

92. FERC Op. No. 69, supra note 78, at 14,281. This compares to 1978 prices for
domestic natural gas of approximately $.91 per thousand cubic feet at the wellhead and
$1.85 per thousand cubic feet to end users. [1981) EN. USERS REP. REFERENCE FILE,
(BNA) at 81:0317, 81:0319.
93. See Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (construction costs estimated as exceeding $1 billion while production capacity re
duced from 250,000 Mcf to 125,000 Mcf of synthetic gas per day).
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"ratepayer project financing."94 Project financing typically requires
a credit capacity from some source to provide assurances loans will
be repaid. In this case the ratepayers, as ultimate consumers of the
commingled gas, would guarantee the 10ans.9s
For the Great Plains project, financing would be 75% debt, ini
tially obtained from commercial lenders, and 25% equity, consisting
of paid-in equity and reinvestment of both the investment tax credit
and the proposed 15% after-tax return on equity investment during
construction. 96 The prospective lenders and equity investors agreed
to sponsor the project only if the FERC approved an "all-events
tariff."97 The all-events tariff was a rate schedule that guaranteed
recovery of debt principal in all events. 98
During the time the Great Plains proposal was under considera
tion, the FPC, in an effort to stimulate research, development, and
demonstration (RD&D) efforts by jurisdictional companies, issued
Order No. 566. 99 Order No. 566 established a procedure whereby
companies contemplating RD&D projects costing more than $50,000
and requiring high risk financial support could apply to the FPC for
advance assurance of rate treatment. 100 If the FPC found the propo
sal met its criteria for necessity and feasibility, in advance, it could
assure investors that operational costs of the project would flow
through to the customers and that RD&D expenditures for the pro
ject would be reflected in the rates charged for gas. lOl
When the Great Plains proposal was cast as an RD&D proposal
instead of as a conventional gas supply project, the FERCI02 ob
served that the technological, environmental, and economic uncer
tainties surrounding the production of high-Btu gas from coal could
deter potential entrepreneurs from undertaking coal gasification in
vestments and that the Great Plains project was needed to eliminate
or reduce those uncertainties. I03 In thus finding that the project
qualified for treatment as an RD&D project, the FERC did not re
94. Id. at 1137.
Id.
96. FERC Op. No. 69, supra note 78, at 14,282.
97. Id. at 14,283.
98. Id.
99. 18 C.F.R. § 154.38(5) (1981).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The FERC had by that time replaced the FPC. 42 U.S.c.A. §§ 7157,7172
(West 1979).
103. FERC Op. No. 69, supra note 78, at 14,286.
95.
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quire standard financing and tariff arrangements. 104 The FERC
considered each of the special financing arrangements proposed by
the Great Plains consortium. Except for reducing the return on eq
uity from 15% to 13% and allowing equity return only for costs "pru
dently incurred" in case of project failure, ·the FERC substantially
approved the financing package and issued a certificate of public
convenience and necessity based upon it. lOS
The Great Plains tariff and financing package authorized by the
FERC constituted a significant departure from past FERC practice.
For example, in Tecon Gas!ftcalion Co. ,106 the FPC rejected a propo
sal to construct a naphtha feedstock gasification facility using a
financing arrangement containing essentially the same features as
were authorized for the Great Plains project.107 In Tecon Gas!ftca
lion, the FPC held that "the gas shortage should not, and legally
cannot, be used to justify unsound and uneconomic projects that will
never be built without the guarantees sought and the transfer of all
risks to the consumer. . . ."108
The FPC issued Tecon Gas!ftcalion during the Arab Oil Em
bargo of 1973. One year later, when presented with a proposal to
construct the nation's first major coal gasification project in Trans
weslern Pipeline Co. (WESCO), 109 it recognized that coal gasifica
tion was one means by which the United States could reduce its
vulnerability to foreign oil markets. 110 Moreover, the FPC acknowl
edged that investors in needed experimental projects would require
some assurance of recovering their investment. 111 Nevertheless, in
WESCO the FPC rejected many of the financing and tariff features
approved by the FERC in its Great Plains decision. 112
Several customers of the pipeline companies involved in the
104. Id. at 14.289.
Id. at 14.289-90.
106. 51 F.P.C. 836 (1974).
107. Id. at 844-46.
108. Id. at 848.
109. 53 F.P.C. 1287 (1975).
110. Id. at 1299.
Ill. Id.
112. The FPC's order issuing a conditional certificate of public convenience and
necessity for WESCO was affirmed on appeal by environmental interests in Silentman v.
FPC. 566 F.2d 237. 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The proposed WESCO plant. originally con
ceived to produce 250 million cubic feet of high-Btu gas per day from New Mexican coal.
was never built. The project's proponents subsequently requested a rate base adjustment
for the expenditures incurred for the study. design and planning of the plant. FERC
denied the request. Transwestem Pipeline Co.• [19791 UTIL. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 12.201. at
13.923-24.
105.
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Great Plains project intervened in the FERC certification proceed
ings. ll3 The administrative law judge who issued the initial decision
on the Great Plains application found that it would be inequitable to
have one-third of the country's gas customers pay all the costs of the
project while the benefits of learning whether it was practicable to
manufacture and market coal gas would inure to the nation as a
whole. 114 When the case was heard before the full Commission, the
FERC noted that while the parties might prefer some form of tax
payer support to spread the costs of the project, no proposal for such
support was before it. I IS In granting the requested certificate of con
venience, however, the FERC ordered that if any legislation was en
acted through which financial support for the project might be
available, the Great Plains sponsors should seek such support. 116
Under reconsideration and clarification of its order in February
1980, the FERC reiterated that "the applicants will be expected to
pursue actively all reasonable measures to spread the direct financial
costs of this project more widely by broadening the support as much
as possible."1l7
Not content with this proviso, the intervenors took an appeal
from the FERC's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. 118 In Office of Consumers' Council v.
FERC,1l9 the court of appeals decided that while the FERC's juris
diction included authority to regulate commingled natural and syn
thetic gas, it did not extend to financing and regulating a facility
devoted exclusively to the production of synthetic gas, especially
prior to the occurrence of a jurisdictional event. 120 The court held
that the FERC exceeded its statutory authority in attempting to cre
ate a ratepayer-based financing package for construction of a com
mercial-sized coal gasification plant, as its ratesetting and.
certificating powers were not granted to it for that purpose.1 21 In
reversing the FERC's action for lack of jurisdiction, the court noted
113.
114.
J.A. 396,
115.
116.
117.
(CCH) ~
118.
119.

Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1137 (quoting the Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge, 28
at 403, 427 (June 6, 1979».
FERC Op. No. 69, supra note 78, at 14,291.
Id.
Great Plains Gasification Assoc., FERC Op. No. 69-A, [1980) UTIL. L. REP.
12,265, at 14,400, 14,405 (Jan. 21, 1980).
Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
655 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
120. Id. at 1143; see Henry v. FPC, 513 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The jurisdic
tional event would be the commingling of the synthetic gas with natural gas. 655 F.2d at
1143.
121. 655 F.2d at 1145.
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that Congress recently had created an integrated, comprehensive
plan for developing the nation's alternative fuels industries. 122 It
held that the FERC improperly had ignored contemporaneous legis
lative acts in attempting to extend its own authority in order to fill a
perceived national need for commercial development of synthetic fu
els. 123 In concluding its opinion, the court echoed Tecon
Gas[jication:
This court fully understands the urgency which underlies our
country's strivings to achieve energy self-sufficiency, and we rec
ognize also that promotion of coal gasification may serve that
goal. But despite the stress of the energy crisis, federal involve
ment in synfuel promotion can only proceed pursuant to legal au
thority conferred by statute. 124

Thus, unless the Natural Gas Act is amended to give the FERC
jurisdiction over such facilities, the indirect route of using an existing
regulatory scheme to underwrite risks and encourage private invest
ments in large-scale coal gasification projects has been foreclosed. In
the meantime, Congress has chosen to promote the synthetic fuels
industry directly with a major commitment of federal dollars.
VI.

THE SFC: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Spurred by cutbacks in supplies of foreign oil, President Carter
addressed the nation on July 15, 1979:
In little more than two decades we've gone from a position of en
ergy independence to one in which almost half of the oil we use
comes from foreign countries, at prices that are going through the
roof. Our excessive dependence on OPEC has already taken a tre
mendous toll on our economy and our people. This is the direct
cause of the long lines which have made millions of you spend
aggravating hours waiting for gasoline. It's a cause of the in
creased inflation and unemployment that we now face. This intol
erable dependence on foreign oil threatens our economic
independence and the very security of our Nation. 125

The Administration proposed a multifaceted energy program
designed to reduce the present 8.5 million barrels per day level of
122.
123.
124.
125.
(July IS,

Id. at 1149-52.
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153.
Energy and National Goals, IS
1979).

WEEKLY COMPo OF

PRES. Doc. 1235, 1239
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petroleum imports by 4.5 million barrels per day in ten years.l 26
Central to this program was a commitment to develop a synthetic
fuels industry capable of producing 2.5 million barrels per day of
crude oil equivalent by 1990.127 To reach this goal, President Carter
proposed the creation of an independent corporation that would
stimulate production of synthetic fuels by using federal funds to un
derwrite the risks that the private sector was unwilling to assume. 128
After almost a year of t:ongressional hearings, reports, and de
bate, the Energy Security Act of 1980 established the SFC, vested
with the responsibility for achieving the national goal of a domestic
synthetic fuel production capability equivalent of at least .5 million
barrels per day of crude oil by 1987 and the equivalent of at least 2
million barrels per day of crude oil by i992. 129 In its initial phase,
the SFC was authorized to solicit proposals for synthetic fuels
projects l30 and to award financial assistance in the form of price
guarantees, purchase agreements, loan guarantees, loans, and joint
ventures to qualified applicants. 13 I In the absence of suitable pro
posals, the SFC, on its own initiative, may build up to three synthetic
fuel projects that it deems essential to the development of a synthetic
fuels industry.132 Twenty billion dollars was appropriated for this
first stage. 133
Within four years, the board of directors of the SFC must sub
mit its comprehensive strategy designed to achieve the production
goals set by the SFCA.134 Upon congressional approval of the com
prehensive strategy, the SFC may submit periodic requests to Con
gress for further appropriations that may total $68 billion over the
next twelve years. 135 The SFC will make no financial commitments
after 1992 and will cease to exist in 1997. 136
Although sponsors and advocates of the SFC have stressed its
independence from the restrictions imposed on government agen
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Fact Sheet on the President's Import Reduction Program, [1979) EN. USERS
REp. (BNA) No. 310, at 3.
129. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8721 (West Supp. 1980).
130. Id. § 8723 (West Supp. 1981).
131. Id. § 8731(b).
132. Id. §§ 8741,8742 (West Supp. 1980).
133. Id. § 8752(b).
134. Id. § 8722 (West Supp. 1981).
135. Id. § 8722 (c)(IO)(lI) (West Supp. 1980).
136. Id. § 8791.
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cies,137 the powers, procedures, and policies of the Board of Direc
tors of the SFC are not substantially different from those accorded
the Administrator of ERDA138 under the Federal Non-Nuclear En
ergy Research and Development Act of 1974.139 Like the SFC, the
Administrator of ERDA was directed to conceive and implement a
comprehensive plan, solicit proposals, and provide financial assist
ance to synthetic fuels projects in the form of joint ventures,
purchase agreements, price guarantees, and loans.140 The Adminis
trator also was authorized to form joint federal-industry corpora
tions to "design, construct, operate and maintain one or more
experimental demonstration or commercial-size facilities or other
operations which will ascertain the technical, environmental and ec
onomic feasibility of a particular energy technology." 141 A 1978
amendment to the Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and De
velopment Act of 1979 gave the Administrator authority to make
loan guarantees for alternative fuel demonstration facilities. 142
. The principal difference between the ERDA program of 1974
and the SFC program of 1980 is not in the institutional structure or
even in the forms of governmental assistance, but in the goals. The
purpose of ERDA was "to establish and vigorously conduct a com
prehensive, national program of basic and applied research and de
velopment, including but not limited to demonstrations of practical
applications, of all potentially beneficial energy sources and utiliza
tion technologies."143 In contrast, "the Synthetic Fuels Corpora
tion's exclusive objective will be the development of domestic
production capacity; it will not engage in research and development
137.
The Energy Security Corporation [established as the Synthetic Fuels
Corporation] would be private and independent, with broad financial authority
bacKed by Treasury financing to prqvide incentive to private firms (and partiCI
pating State and local governments), to achieve production of petroleum substi
tutes. As a private Corporation, specifically not an instrumentality of the
Federal government, it would function under laws governing such entities and
would be exempt from most restrictions governing Federal agency operations.
Energy Financing Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs on Providing Federal Assistance to Encourage the Commercialization 0/
Synthetic Fuels, Solar and Alternative Energy Technologies, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 287
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Energy Financing Legislation] (statement of John M. Deutch,
Acting Under Secretary, Dept. of Energy).
138. See notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text for a brief statutory history of
the Energy Research Development Agency.
139. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5901-5920 (West Supp. 1981) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901
5920 (1976».
140. Id. §§ 5903, 5905, 5906(a) (West 1976).
141. Id. § 5906(b).
142. Id. § 5919 (West Supp. 1980).
143. Id. § 5902(b)(1) (West 1976).
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activities."144
With the SFC, the government has moved from research and
development (R&D) to demonstration and deployment (0&0) of
synthetic fuels technology.145 The decision has been made that the
potential public benefit from reduced oil imports outweighs the risks
that have prevented private investors from undertaking such
projects. l46 Indeed, the board of directors of the SFC is directed to
award financial assistance only after a dete~ation "that adequate
financing for the project would not otherwise be available to a pro
posed synthetic fuel project on reasonable terms and conditions
which would permit such project to be undertaken." 147 Although the
stated purpose of this requirement is to ensure that SFC funding will
supplement and not supplant private investment, the result will be
selective subsidization of projects that private industry has deemed
to be an unappealing investment. 148
The private sector, not the government, will be the primary pro
ducer and consumer of synthetic fuels. Some, therefore, have argued
that substitution of government decisionmaking for private decision
making at the deployment stage could result in serious distortions in
the energy market. 149 Projects with government backing would have
a decisive economic advantage that could foreclose privately spon
sored alternatives. Government financing could lead to prolonged
and expensive subsidization of noncompetitive technologies. I50 In
144. [1979) EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 310, at 3.
145. The distinction between research and development activities and commercial
sized demonstration and deployment activities is derived from FORD FOUNDATION, EN
ERGY, supra note 16, at 543-68.
146. "Investors have not been willing to commit sizeable funds to projects involv
ing technologies which have been untested at commercial scales of operation. . . . How
ever, given the goals set by the President, we cannot afford the years of delay that would
be required to proceed through a more extensive technical evaluation. . . ." Hearings on
Energy Financing Legislation Before the Senate Committee on Banking, HOUSing, and Ur
ban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1979) (statement of Robert Carswell, Deputy Secre
tary, Depart. of the Treasury).
147. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8731(r) (West Supp. 1980).
148. At least one, admittedly rather small scale, coal-based synthetic fuels project
has been undertaken, entirely with private funding, in Southern California. [1979) EN
ERGY MGMT. (CCH) Supp. No. 341, at 13.
149. See Synthetic Fuels Legislation, supra note 61, at 161 (statement of the Re
search and Policy Comm. of the Comm. for Economic Development) (''governmentalpol
icies that have distorted the economics of energy production and conservation in the past are
now acting to discourage needed investment in new technologies.") (emphasis in original).
150. Private industry is much better able than any government bureaucracy
to stop the development of a particular project if it rater turns out that it is not
as promising as it once appeared. By letting the government commit us to one
or more particular technorogies, we create a set of political forces which make
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spite of the SFC's commitment to encouraging a diversity oftechnol
ogies,151 it appears probable that the magnitude of commercial-sized
undertakings will have a chilling effect on technological innovation
because of the high stakes involved. The Ford Foundation study
concluded that the government should resist pressures for govern
ment involvement in demonstration and deployment of synthetic fu
els production facilities. 152 The study also concluded that spending
public funds on such projects is not a substitute for decontrolling oil
prices, streamlining environmental regulation, or otherwise rational
izing the framework in which private sector decisions are made. 153
The private sector, on the other hand, is geared towards produc
ing profits for investors, and this objective may not produce a result
that responds to the national interest. Some have suggested that pri
vate oil companies, which control the bulk of the resources required
for synthetic fuels production, already are distorting the market by
pegging the cost of alternative fuels to the cost of competing domes
tic petroleum. 154 In any case, where the goal is to reduce oil imports
by raising domestic production, some government intervention in the
marketplace may be necessary to induce production above the level
at which costs are competitive with the cost of imported oil. 155
Granting this inherent inefficiency in any D&D program with a
production goal that is independent of market forces, the SFC will
mimic free market decisionmaking as much as possible. In selecting
proposals for support, the SFC will consider the extent of federal
assistance required, the potential cost per unit of production, the
overall production potential of the technology, and the potential of
the technology for complying with applicable regulatory require
ments}56 Further, if a project involves production of purchase by an
the termination of an undesireable project difficult, and which make in.creased
1
subsidies to make the project "successful" very likely.
Energy Financing Legislation, supra note 137, at 156-57 (statement of Robert Pindyck,
Prof. of Economics, M.LT.).
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8722(a)(2)(A), § 8722(b)(I)(A), § 8722(b)(3)(F) and
§ 8731(b)(3)(A) explicitly require that the SFC should seek to support a diversity of tech
nologies in awarding financial assistance and formulating its comprehensive strategy.
152. FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY, supra note 16, at 558-60.
153. Id. at 561.
154. Horizontal divestiture oflarge oil companies, on the other hand, could reduce
both the capital and the technical expertise available for development of synthetic fuels.
Solomon & Riesmeyer, The lJevelopment ofAlternate Energy Sources: A Legal and Policy
Analysis, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 332-33 (1977).
155. Holcombe, Taxa/ion and Energy Policy, 26 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 224, 230
(1977).
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8731(b)(2)(3) (West Supp. 1980).
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entity with rates that are regulated, the SFC will consider whether
the regulatory body is likely to issue a ratemaking decision that will
protect the financial interests of the investors and the SFC.157
Congress was aware of efforts to commercialize coal gasification
and included a provision in the SFCA that the Secretary of Energy,
who is authorized to act on behalf of the SFC prior to its formal
organization, should give expedited consideration to proposals for
commercial-sized high-Btu coal gas plants. 15s In conformity with
this legislative directive, the DOE recently guaranteed $2.02 billion
in loans l59 for the Great Plains projects. l60
As a result of the holding in Office of Consumers' Counsel Y.
FERC,161 the project sponsors restructured the project to operate as
a nonjurisdictional entity. 162 Under an offer of settlement approved
by the FERC and unchallenged by the intervenors,163 the ratepayers
will pay only for gas received and will not bear any costs if the pro
ject fails. The only guarantee the project sponsors sought and ob
tained was advance assurance that the cost of gas will be recovered
from the ratepayer when the gas actually begins to flOW. I64 In view
of the large sums of money to be committed, it was recognized that
the project could not proceed without such cost-recovery assurances.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Despite the eventual success in securing financial commitments
for the Great Plains project, it should not be viewed as precedent for
similar coal gasification projects. The FERC specifically held that
the rate authorization contained in the settlement offer is to be
157. Id. § 8731(1).
158. Id. § 8723(e).
159. On July 8, 1980, Congress passed the Supplemental Appropriations and
Recission Act, Pub. L. 96-304, 94 Stat. 857, 867-70 which authorized the Department of
Energy to spend $3.31 billion, in addition to the $21.208 billion allocated under the Fed
eral Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act, 42 U.S.c.A. § 5915 (West
1974) (as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5915 (West Supp. 1980», to support synthetic fuels
projects. Such projects will be assumed by the SFC when it becomes operational.
160. [1981] EN. USERS REp. (BNA) No. 417, at 1193.
161. 655 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See notes 118-22 supra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the court of appeals decision.
162. Great Plains Gasification Associates, FERC Op. No. 119, [1981] UTIL. L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 12,442, at 15,462 (April 30, 1981). As finally structured, the ratepayers will
not finance the construction of the project, id. at 15,465, the debt will be guaranteed
under the federal loan guarantee, and the project sponsors equity will be at risk in the
event of project failure. Id. In addition, the price of the gas will be fixed in accordance
with an established formula. Id.
163. Id. at 15,462.
164. Id. at 15,465.
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treated as sui generis .165 This holding, coupled with the controversy
surrounding the federal loan guarantee for the Great Plains pro
ject,166 clearly indicates limited government support for such
projects. In view of potentially limited government support for such
future projects, it would appear that the prospects for the private
synthetic fuels industry in the United States presently are no more
certain than they were prior to the enactment of the SFCA.
As was the case in South Africa with SASOL 1,167 the primary
return from the Great Plains project will be knowledge, not profit. 168
If the Great Plains project shows coal gasification on a commercial
scale to be technologically feasible, environmentally sound, and
financially rewarding, it may well be expected that private industry
will be more willing to invest in such projects in the future. Until the
results of the Great Plains project are known, private investment in,
and the rapid development of, synthetic fuel in the United States
does not appear to be realistic.

165. Id. at 15,469.
166. The level of disagreement within the Administration required the President to
personally solve the dispute. (1981) EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 415, at 1121-22.
167. See OVERSIGHT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE
EAST, supra note 10, for a discussion of South Africa's SASOL projects.
168. See Office of Consumers' Council v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1135, 1137 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (project justified as a test of the viability of coal gasification technology, not as a
gas supply project).

